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Prompt Release of Detained Foreign Vessels and Crews
in Matters of Marine Environment Protection

HEIKI LINDPERE∗

Article 292 of the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea (Convention) reads:
1. Where the authorities of a state party have detained a vessel flying
the flag of another state party and it is alleged that the detaining state
has not complied with the provisions of this Convention for the
prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon posting of a reasonable
bond or other financial security, the question of release from
detention may be submitted to any court or tribunal agreed upon by
the parties or, failing such agreement within 10 days from the time of
detention, to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining state under
article 287 or to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
unless the parties otherwise agree.
2. The application for release may be made only by or on behalf of
the flag state of the vessel.
3. The court or tribunal shall deal without delay with the application
for release and shall deal only with the question of release, without
prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic
forum against the vessel, its owner or its crew. The authorities of the
detaining state remain competent to release the vessel or its crew at
any time.
4. Upon the posting of the bond or other financial security determined
by the court or tribunal, the authorities of the detaining state shall
comply promptly with the decision of the court or tribunal concerning
the release of the vessel or its crew.
This article provides for a special prompt release procedure (PRP) as
an international proceeding in cases of detained foreign vessels and crews.
"The purpose of these new rules," says Rainer Lagoni, "is to balance the
interests of the detaining state in its measures against the flag state with the
∗
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interests of the flag state in preventing an excessive detention of vessels flying
its flag."1 PRP aims to protect vessels' owners or charterers' economic
interests and the humanitarian needs of crews. It is also intended to blunt the
impact of the newly established institution – exclusive economic zones (EEZ)
in the Convention.2
It will serve private individuals and provide them with a measure to
challenge actions by coastal states, and avoid serious consequences for the
individual resulting from an infringement of the coastal state’s respective
rights. Consequently, it is seen as "compensation" by coastal states for
extended jurisdiction.3 In other words, it is "aiming at completing the balance
of rights in the EEZ by preventing conduct of the coastal state which rises
strong concerns of other states, and which could, in a broad sense, be
considered as abusive."4 Generally speaking provisions on release of the
vessel and its crew accommodate economic and humanitarian as well as
safety and environmental concerns.5
The essence of Article 292, carefully negotiated novelty in the
contemporary law of the sea, is that PRP is applicable where substantive
provisions of the Convention specifically foresee prompt release of detained
foreign vessels and their crews upon posting reasonable bond or other
financial security.6 The right of detention of foreign vessels is permitted or
denied in several substantive provisions of the Convention.7 By contrast, the
1

See: Rainer Lagoni, "The Prompt Release of Vessels and Crews before the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Preparatory Report," 11
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 147 (1996).
2
In this context, B.H. Oxman writes: "In particular, the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone represents a dramatic geographic and functional expansion of coastal
state jurisdiction bringing a third of the marine environment within the limits of
coastal state jurisdiction." See, Bernard H. Oxman, “Observations on Vessel Release
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," 11 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 202 (1996).
3
See, Florian H.Th. Wegelein, "The Rules of the Tribunal in the Light of
Prompt Release of Vessels," (1999) 30 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL
LAW 265, 266.
4
Tullio Treves. "The Exclusive Economic Zone and the Settlement of
Disputes." THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982-2000: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF STATE
PRACTICE. Eds. Erik Franck and Philippe Gauthier. Brylant, Brussels, 2003. 90.
5
See: Bernard H. Oxman, op.cit. 203.
6
see: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982. A
COMMENTARY. Vol.V. Ed. Myron H. Nordquist. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Dordrecht, 1989. 66-71.
7
The term "detention" used in Article 292 of the Convention "is to be read
according to its broadest meaning covering all cases in which the movement of a
vessel or of persons is prevented by an authority." See, Tullio Treves, "The

242

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION

[Vol. 33:2

prompt release is only prescribed in five cases of permitted detentions: Article
73(2), Article 220(7) and (8), Article 226(1) "b" and "c."8 Article 292(1)
stipulates as precondition for PRP that "the detaining state has not complied
with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or
its crew" which makes the commentators of the Convention say: "Thus the
right to complain about detention is restricted to the cases expressly provided
for in the substantive parts of the Convention."9
PRP are the proceedings before an international court or tribunal
between the states' parties to the Convention, in principle, "independent from
domestic as well as from other international proceedings."10 These can "only
be excluded by agreement."11 PRP is of compulsory nature in the sense that a
unilateral action of the flag state concerned is sufficient to institute
proceedings. If the flag state and the detaining state have failed within 10 days
of the detention to reach agreement on the court or tribunal to decide the
dispute, the flag state will have the right to submit the question of release
unilaterally to the court or tribunal accepted by the detaining state under
Article 287.12 Alternatively, it can submit the question to the International
Proceedings Concerning Prompt Release of Vessels and Crews before the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea," 11 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 182 (1996).
8
No author is considering Article 220(8) of the Convention as a provision
which violation makes PRP applicable. See, e.g. Tullio Treves, op.cit. 179; Rainer
Lagoni, 147-164; David H.Anderson. "Investigation, Detention and Release of
Foreign Vessels under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and Other
International Agreements," 11 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL
LAW 165 (1996); Erik Jaap Molenaar, COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION OVER VESSELSOURCE POLLUTION. Kluwer: The Hague, 1998. 490,491.
9
A Commentary in footnote nr.6, 69 (paragraph 292.5).
10
See: Tullio Treves, op.cit. 179.
11
See: Rainer Lagoni, op.cit. 147.
12
Article 287 (1) of the Convention gives a State to choose, by means of a
written declaration at signing, ratifying or acceeding to this Convention or at any time
thereafter, one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in
accordance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
(d) special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for
one or more categories of disputes specified therein.
We note that the following paragraphs of that Article give three important rules for
submission of a particular dispute to a court or tribunal mentioned above. Firstly, in
cases when choices of procedure of the parties to the dispute differ, or where one of
them had not previously indicated its choice – the procedure to be followed is
arbitration in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention. Secondly, if the parties
to the dispute have accepted the same procedure for settlement of the dispute, this
procedure shall be followed. Both rules are subject to the right of parties to agree
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Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), established in Hamburg in 1996.13
Such action could be brought "only by or on behalf of the flag state."14 Article
292(2) is a very strict one and allows the application for release only by or on
behalf of the flag state of the vessel. Determing who has the authority to bring
an issue before an international tribunal on behalf of a particular state is
purely a matter of domestic law.15 Nevertheless the release can be asked not
only for the vessel but also for crews, and, as we know, detained members of
a crew could have different nationalities. Because of the imperative nature of
paragraph 2, Article 292 of the Convention the only conclusion is that the flag
state, but not the state of nationality of the members of the crew is granted
locus standi.16
PRP is an extremely speedy procedure for an international forum of
dispute settlement.17 The procedure could be commenced immediately after
ten days have lapsed from the date of detention and should be dealt by a court
or tribunal "without delay."18 PRP has a certain priority stipulated for it in
Article 112(1) of the Rules of the ITLOS, as well as short time-limits for

otherwise. Thirdly, when a state party (to the Convention) which is party to the
dispute has not made any declaration (in force), it shall be deemed to have accepted
arbitration in accordance with Annex VII. This resolution embodied in Article 287 of
the Convention is actually called "the Montreaux (Riphagen) Compromise"– see:
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. A Commentary. Vol.V. Ed.
Myron H.Nordquist. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Dordrecht, 1989, 8; or professor
Alan E.Boyle is calling "the cafeteria approach" – see: Alan E.Boyle, "Dispute
Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and
Jurisdiction," 46 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 39, 40
(1997).
13
Article 292(1) of the Convention makes ITLOS the "default body" or gives
him the competence of "last resort." See, Tullio Treves, op.cit., 187; Florian
H.Th.Wegelein, op.cit., 265; Shabtai Rosenne, "Establishing the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea," 89 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
813 (1995).
14
See, e.g., Bernard H. Oxman, op.cit. 211-213.
15
See, A Commentary in footnote nr.6, 70, 71 (paragraph 292.9).
16
See, Tullio Treves, op.cit., p.182; Erik Jaap Molenaar, op.cit., 489.
17
In this context use of the term prompt is correct but it goes only for the
procedure itself while instituted. In the "Camouco" case (Panama v. France; List of
cases nr.5) in paragraph 54 of the Judgement of 7 February 2000 the ITLOS
confirmed that there is no time limit for a flag state to present an application for
release while the respondent argued that the applicant has been inactive 3 month and
has created a situation akin to estoppel. It is noteworthy that in the case of Volga
(Russian Federation v. Australia; List of cases nr.11 for the ITLOS), the detention
was effected on February 7th, but the application for prompt release was made on
December 2nd, 2002 (almost 10 months later).
18
See Article 292(3) of the Convention.
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every important element of the procedure, including adoption of the
judgement.19
F.Wegelein has calculated in 1999 that there be no more than 32 days
between a detention and the judgement. However, today this figure is 41 days
because of the amendments of the Rules of March 15th, 2001 where an
additional five days was provided for commencement of a hearing and four
days more to adopt a decision. With these time-limits, even provisional
measures provided for in Article 290 of the Convention could not compete. 20
One could agree that "arbitral tribunals are generally not appropriate for
urgent detention cases."21 It is also noteworthy that PRP is a separate
procedure from any domestic one and therefore the principle of exhaustion of
local remedies which is provided for in Article 295 of the Convention is
conceptually not applicable to PRP cases (see Article 292(3)).22
The concept of PRP was first proposed by the United States in 1973
in its 9-article draft for a chapter on the settlement of disputes for the
Convention.23 Article 8(2) states:
The owner or operator of any vessel detained by any state shall have
the right to bring the question of the detention of the vessel before the
Tribunal in order to secure its prompt release in accordance with the
applicable provisions of this Convention, without prejudice to the
merits of any case of any case against the vessel.24
This proposal, which may have been inspired by the experience of US tuna
vessels in the Pacific, was later changed at the Third UN Conference on the
Law of the Sea in details only, though they were important details.25 Thus,
19

The provision reads: "The Tribunal shall give priority to applications for
release of vessels or crews over all other proceedings before the Tribunal." However,
if the Tribunal is seized of an application for release of a vessel or crew and of request
for the prescription of provisional measures, it shall take the necessary measures to
ensure that both the application and the request are dealt with without delay.” The full
text of these Rules are available on World Wide Web at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/Rules-Tribunal.htm (hereinafter - Rules);
20
See, F.Wegelein, op.cit. 263-265, 266.
21
See, Rainer Lagoni, op.cit. 151; there are of course other substantive
reasons giving priority to PRP (commenced unilaterally, judgement is final, etc.) over
provisional measures.
22
Inapplicability of this principle for PRP is also the view of ITLOS, stated
in paragraph 57 of the 7 February 2000 Judgement on Camouco (Panama v. France;
List of cases nr.5).
23
For more detail, see, A Commentary, note 6, 66-71.
24
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEA-BED AND
THE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION. Volume II.
General Assembly, Official Records: Twenty-Eight session, Supplement Nr.21
(A/9021).United Nations. New York, 1973, 22, 23.
25
See, David H.Anderson, op.cit. 167.
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PRP has kept some of its basic approaches, like PRP is not to intervene into
any domestic procedure in the detaining state. PRP retained the rules
prohibiting any selection of the availability of PRP among possible detentions
or arrests (permitted or prohibited) within Article 292 of the Convention, but
left this issue for the substantive provisions to decide in any particular case.
There has not been much written on the prompt release of detained
foreign vessels and crews in legal literature. It should first be mentioned that
the Law of the Sea and Maritime Law Institute of the University of Hamburg
together with the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce and German Maritime
Law Association organized a workshop, The International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea: Establishment and "Prompt Release" Procedures, held on 17
November 1995 in Hamburg. This resulted in published papers of speakers
Professor Rainer Lagoni, Judge David H.Anderson, Professor Tullio Treves,
Professor Bernard H.Oxman, and others in 11 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (1996). Professor Florian Wegelein analysed in
detail the procedural aspects of prompt release with the purpose of evaluating
the newly adopted Rules of the ITLOS in the light of the first case, the M/V
Saiga. On the other hand, Erik Jaap Molenaar concentrated his attention on
the substantive articles of the Convention. The commentators of the relevant
part of the Convention dealt with the "birth" of the unusual Article 292 in
only five short pages of commentary. There are a small number of well
respected authors touching on the PRP subject in general, but no author has
yet made a comprehensive analysis of all the different aspects of this
procedure.26
Analysis of current flag state practice of using PRP shows that there
have been six cases brought before and five decided by ITLOS.27 The reasons
for the detentions have been exclusively related to violations of coastal states'
laws on fisheries.28 Why have there been no PRP cases in ITLOS so far? First,
PRP is not the only remedy in public international law to resort for the flag
state in order to help an owner of a ship to get her and her crew released. In
26

See, Gudmundur Eirikson. THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW
OF THE SEA. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. The hague.2000, 118-121. See also, THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA. LAW AND PRACTICE. Ed. by P.
Chandrasekhara Rao and Rahmatullah Khan. Kluwer Law International. The Hague,
2001, 55 (L.D.M. Nelson), and 152-155 (Tullio Treves).
27
See, http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/list_of_cases.pl?language=en, case
number 9, the Chaisiri Reefer 2 (Panama v.Yemen) was discontinued by the parties to
the dispute according to the Article 105, paragraph 2 of the Rules of the Tribunal.
28
Actually, in the first case of ITLOS – prompt release of mv Saiga – the
coastal state of Guinea claimed that the Saiga was engaged in smuggling and customs
violations for refuelling three fishing vessels within the EEZ of Guinea prior to arrest.
But the Tribunal found that offshore bunkering of fishing vessels is related to fishing
activities. See also, F.Wegelein, op.cit. 275-277.
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cases of pollution of the marine environment beyond the territorial sea of the
detaining state, there has not been a case of major damage to the coastal state.
The flag state has the protection of the normal enforcement record Article 228
(1) of the Convention, providing the flag state with a right of pre-emption.
Namely, the flag state can request suspension of the proceedings already
instituted by the port or coastal state (within six months of that institution) and
take over handling of this violation.
Second, following the Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967 the
international community has established a more or less satisfactory regime for
oil pollution liability by adopting the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage (hereinafter CLC) and the 1971 Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage and by amending them both by protocols into new 1992
Conventions.29 While oil pollution by discharges from vessels occurs and
causes damage, nothing prevents aggrieved individuals or governments from
instituting respective civil proceedings against the owner of the vessel.30 This
usually begins with the arrest of that vessel in order to obtain security for the
maritime claim.31 The latter right is based on the 1952 or 1999 international
arrest conventions as well as the right that the vessel shall be released by the
arresting court in cases where sufficient security is given in satisfactory form
by the owner of the vessel or his insurer.32 The owner of the delinquent vessel,
in order to get her released, could also rely on a procedure provided for in the
London 1976 International Convention on the Limitation of Liability on
Maritime Claims (hereinafter LLMC-76).33 There are similar arrangements in
national laws which give him or his insurer the right to establish with the
court a compensation fund covering his limited liability in full.34
29

See for example, Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle. International Law & the
Environment. Second edition. Oxford, University Press. 2002, pp.385-389.
30
Article 229 of the Convention says: "Nothing in this Convention affects
the institution of civil proceedings in respect of any claim for loss or damage resulting
from pollution of the marine environment."
31
In cases like the grounding of the Maltese flagged tanker Tasman Spirit in
July 2003 at the entrance to the port of Karachi, Pakistan. In this incident, there was a
spill of 29,000 tons of oil. The vessel was arrested first by the cargo interest for loss
of cargo. See, "Pakistan under fire over Tasman Spirit Karachi response," in:
LLOYD`S LIST, Friday, October 17, 2003.
32
About these arrest conventions see, Francesco Berlingieri, ARREST OF
SHIPS. A COMMENTARY ON THE 1952 AND 1999 ARREST CONVENTIONS. Third ed.
CMI, LLP, London, 2000.
33
Text of LLMC-76 see, Ignacio Arroyo, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
CONVENTIONS. Kluwer, Dewenter (1991), 1401-1412.
34
Nevertheless, Article 3 (b) excludes LLMC-76 rules for application in
claims of oil pollution damage "within the meaning of abovementioned CLC 69/92,"
but this mechanism of a compensation fund is also used by nations for oil pollution
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In cases of a civil arrest it is normal to consider that the owner of the
delinquent vessel should have to resort to those remedies provided in the
national civil law of the arresting court firstly and consequently PRP has
secondary importance.35 But, it seems possible and sometimes reasonable for
vessel owners to resort to PRP in cases of major, long-lasting disputes over
such issues as whether the owner has lost the right to limit his liability at all,
or the arresting state has extraordinarily severe laws on loss or damage
compensation, and punishment of responsible members of a crew for any
pollution damage it caused (all of which all are of great importance in
determining the amount of security necessary for the release). Therefore, a
question arises whether it was necessary to formulate Article 220(7) in such a
way and duplicate private law obligations of states to release a vessel under
public international law obligations and subject it to PRP, especially while the
latter is applicable for states' parties to the CLC. There are three different
reasons aimed at speeding up the release:
1) CLC does not deal with the release of crews at all;
2) civil proceedings could not have been started at all and a vessel and
its crew is detained in the coastal state by a competent executive
body;
3) a vessel is arrested in civil proceedings, but nevertheless the fund is
constituted and the release is denied because of a lasting dispute over
whether the owner has the right to limit his liability.
We now turn to the main questions of applicability of PRP in the field
of prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment.
This paper does not consider such issues as applicability of PRP in different
maritime zones, and substantive provisions in the Convention providing for
prompt release. Nor does it consider bonds or other financial security as
preconditions for a vessel's release.
PRP as part of the dispute settlement system of the Convention
One of the significant achievements of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (the Conference) has definitely been the
development of a comprehensive system for the settlement of the disputes that
may arise with respect to the interpretation or application of the Convention.36
Notwithstanding the criticism of Judges Oda and Guillaume, Professor Alan
cases, obviously with other limits of liability. See, e.g. the Maritime Law Act of the
Republic of Estonia of June 5th, 2002, Articles 78 and 83 (RT I 2002, 55, 345).
35
"Arrest" according to Article 1 (2) of the International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going ships, 1952 means
"the detention of a ship by judicial process to secure a maritime claim, but does not
include the seizure of a ship in execution or satisfaction of a judgement."
36
See, A COMMENTARY in note 6, 5.
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E. Boyle considers this system "as the most important development in the
settlement of international disputes since the adoption of the UN Charter and
the Statute of the International Court of Justice."37 This dispute settlement
system in the Part XV of the Convention is predicated on the general principle
that agreement between the states' parties to the dispute on the choice of
procedure among any peaceful means is always prevailing (Article 280).38
Only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to those "peaceful
means of their own choice," including lack of any agreement on procedure,39
any state as a party to the dispute is entitled to submit it to any court or
tribunal having jurisdiction under section 2 "Compulsory Procedures
Entailing Binding Decisions" of the Convention (see Article 286).40
At the same time the provisions of Section 3 of Part XV of the
Convention (Articles 297 and 298), "Limitations and Exceptions to
Applicability of Section 2," exclude or provide states with the right to opt out
of certain types of issues arising in the interpretation and application of the
Convention or other international agreements related to the purpose of it from
the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of Section 2 (Articles 286 et
seq.), including Article 292. For the purposes of this article, it is important to
note that Article 297(1)© confirms unequivocally that such disputes on the
protection and preservation of the marine environment are subject to the
procedures provided for in the Section 2 "Compulsory Procedures Entailing
Binding Decisions." Such protection of making available third-party dispute
settlement procedures was achieved in the text of Article 297 during the
Conference as certain balance of the interests of the coastal states and those of
the states with major navigational interests, as well as those of the landlocked
and geographically disadvantaged states.41

37

Judges S. Oda and G. Guillaume have argued that the ITLOS is a futile
institution and that creation of a specialized tribunal may destroy the unity of
international law. See, S. Oda, "The ICJ Viewed from the Bench," 244 II HAG. REC.
127-155 (1993); and S. Oda, "Dispute settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea," 44
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 863 (1995); G. Guillaume,
"The Future of International Judicial Institutions," 44 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 848 (1995).
38
Article 280 of the Convention states: "Nothing in this Part impairs the
right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by any peaceful means
of their own choice."
39
There is obligation to States Parties to proceed expeditiously to exchange
views regarding the settlement when a dispute arises, see Article 283 of the
Convention.
40
The whole of Section 2 is subject to limitations and exceptions in Section
3 (Articles 297 and 298).
41
See, A COMMENTARY in footnote nr.6, p.105 (paragraph 297.19).
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Access to a court or tribunal: jurisdiction Ratione Personae and Ratione
Materiae
The first question relating to applicability of PRP is whether Article
292 (1) shall be interpreted to mean that only states' parties to the Convention
may invoke the PRP procedure. This basic problem has not yet been fully
elaborated in detail in the literature. Article 288 dealing with the question of
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal referred to in Article 287 (1), confers in
paragraph 1 jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of the Convention which is submitted to it in accordance with the
provisions of Part XV. Of course, according to the international law of the
treaties this principle is valid for the states' parties to the Convention. At the
same time, however, paragraph 2 of Article 288 says:
A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall also have
jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of an international agreement related to the
purpose of this Convention, which is submitted to it in
accordance with the agreement.
This extension of jurisdiction to "an international agreement related to
the purpose of the Convention" is seen by some authors related to jurisdiction,
but on substantive law or ratione materiae only.42 However, professor Rainer
Lagoni argues for the applicability of PRP for non-parties to the Convention
and he stresses that "such agreement may…be on a permanent or ad hoc
basis."43 He is correct, because the relevant legal requirement is that
application should be made according to such an "other agreement" with no
request that parties to that agreement shall be the state parties to the
Convention. Therefore, such an extension of jurisdiction goes also for the
second aspect of jurisdiction – rationae personae, or, parties to an agreement.
This second question relates to the general conclusion of Professor
Alan E.Boyle on jurisdiction of ratione materiae of the ITLOS. His work is
based on the wording of Article 21 of its Statute that the ITLOS is
"unintentionally made a court of general jurisdiction." He contends this on a
basis that while Article 288(2) limits its compulsory jurisdiction to cases
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention or of any
"international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention" then no
comparable restriction is found in Article 21 of Annex VI (Statute of the
ITLOS) which provides for "any other agreement;" In order to support this
"doubt" he advances another argument based on Article 293(1) which likely
allows for a tribunal "to decide matters of general international law that are

42
43

See, Erik Jaap Molenaar, op.cit. 484.
See, Rainer Lagoni, op.cit. 150.
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not part of the law of the sea." 44 This reasoning is also faulty because that
paragraph is dealing with applicable law only for a court or tribunal having
already established jurisdiction. There is no doubt that the ICJ is the only
international court of general jurisdiction.45 ITLOS "thus possesses a general
jurisdiction over all disputes relating to the law of the sea" (which it shares
with the ICJ), according to the limitation provided for in Article 288(2),
nevertheless, the latter is not repeated in Article 21 of the Statute of the
ITLOS.46
Scope of application of PRP in cases of marine environment protection:
general remarks
Article 292(1) stipulates as a precondition that "the detaining state has
not complied with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release of
the vessel or its crew." This wording is the basis for the commentators to
conclude that "[t]hus the right to complain about detention is restricted to the
cases expressly provided for in the substantive parts of the Convention."47
These substantive provisions in the Convention in matters of marine
environmental protection are contained in Article 220(7) and (8), Article
226(1), b and c.
Application of PRP by analogy
Some authors predict difficulties for the operation of Article 292
because it remains unclear to them what its relationship is to cases where the
detention violates the Convention but no substantive prompt release article
applies.48 Professor Rainer Lagoni argues that in cases where a detention of a
vessel is obviously violating the Convention it would be appropriate to apply
Article 292 by analogy "and it would serve the interests of the flag state more
effectively than the uncertain possibility to request its release as a provisional
measure pursuant to Article 290." He points out as an example Article 97 (3)
which provides for "matters of collision or any other incident of navigation"
44

See, Alan E.Boyle, note 12, 49.
See, Jonathan I. Charney. "The Impact on the International Legal System
of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals." 31 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS 705 (1999).
46
See, L. Dolliver M. Nelson. The International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea: Some Issues," in THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA. LAW
AND PRACTICE. Eds. P. Chandrasekhara Rao and Rahmatullah Khan. Kluwer: The
Hague. 2001. 53, 54.
47
See, note 6, 69 (para. 292.5).
48
See, Alan E.Boyle, "UNCLOS, the Marine Environment and the
Settlement of Disputes," in COMPETING NORMS IN THE LAW OF MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION – FOCUS ON SHIP SAFETY AND POLLUTION
PREVENTION. Ed. Henrik Ringbom. Kluwer: London, 1997, 245.
45
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on the high seas that "no arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of
investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of the flag
state."49 Professor Tullio Treves strongly agrees, stating:
if a vessel or its crew has been detained in contravention of a
provision of the Convention which prohibits detention, it
seems reasonable to hold that the most expeditious procedure
available should be resorted to in order to ensure the release
of the vessel or crew, independently of the question of
international responsibility for the violation of the
Convention. It would seem absurd to me that the prompt
release procedure should be available in cases in which
detention is permitted by the Convention, such as those of
Articles 73, 220 and 226, and not available in cases in which
it is not permitted by it.
Additionally, regarding Article 97 (3) he uses Article 28 (2) as an example,
which in certain cases prohibits enforcement of civil jurisdiction by the
coastal state against foreign vessels passing through the territorial sea.50 Erik
Jaap Molenaar cites both authors on this issue, but his own point of view is
lacking.51
Such application of PRP by analogy will definitely undermine the
whole concept of Article 292 and compromise reached in it. We note in this
respect too that paragraph 3 of Article 292 does not allow a court or tribunal
to be burdened with the full evaluation of the legality of detention in question
(as a question on the merits) at all.
Application of PRP in cases of several conflicting grounds for a detention or
arrest
Presence of several maritime claims at the same time could create
additional limitations on the applicability of PRP. Where a foreign vessel is
detained or arrested for two reasons, only one of which gives to the flag state
opportunity to apply for PRP and other not, it seems impossible to achieve the
release.52 In other words, the latter reason "prevails over others."53 In such
cases, Professor Rainer Lagoni concludes rightly that the ITLOS "has to take
the submissions of the detaining state into consideration and it may enquire
whether this was merely an excuse made in bad faith or that it constituted an

49

See, Rainer Lagoni, op.cit. 158.
See, Tullio Treves (1996), op.cit. 186.
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See, Erik Jaap Molenaar, op.cit. 490, 491.
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David H.Anderson concludes that "release under Article 292 may not be
possible, ibid" 177.
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See, Rainer Lagoni, op.cit. 159.
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abuse of rights. If not, the Tribunal has to dismiss the question of prompt
release."
Admissibility of applications for PRP
Except for Wegelein, admissibility of disputes under Article 292 (1)
has not been particularly analyzed by authors yet. Others have considered it, if
at all, to be sufficient to refer to Article 113 (1) and (2) of the Rules of the
ITLOS, which state the following:
(1) The Tribunal shall in its judgement determine in each case
in accordance with Article 292 of the Convention whether or
not the allegation made by the applicant that the detaining
state has not complied with a provision of the Convention for
the prompt release of the vessel or the crew upon the posting
of a reasonable bond or other financial security is wellfounded.
(2) If the Tribunal decides that the allegation is well-founded,
it shall determine the amount, nature and form of the bond or
other financial security to be posted for the release of the
vessel or the crew.54
F. Wegelein makes a lengthy analysis on admissibility and the
standard of appreciation.55 He also compares the ICJ practice in the
Ambatielos case56 and the ITLOS
practice in the Saiga case no. 1 in considerable depth.57 He writes:
to be admissible the application in Prompt Release of Vessel
proceedings it has only to "allege" a violation of an obligation
to release the vessel. The tribunal decides whether or not an
application is vexatious or an abuse of the Tribunal. …The
Tribunal itself finds that the allegations have to be of a
"sufficiently plausible character" in order to base a judgement
on them.…Thus the interpretation of Article 292 (1) of the
54

See, Tullio Treves. "The Jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea," in
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Chakndrasekhara Rao and Rahmatullah Khan. Kluwer Law International: The Hague,
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55
The standard of appreciation is the standard by which the Tribunal decides
whether the allegation of the requesting party of an infraction by the coastal State is
sufficient for an order of prompt release.
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See, Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), Merits: Obligation to Arbitrate,
1953 I.C.J. 10, 18 (Judgement of May 19).
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1982 Convention now has a second standard: "well-founded"
gives an idea of the legal quality of the allegation, and
"sufficiently plausible" gives an idea of what "well-founded"
should mean and so introduces just another legal standard for
the allegation.
In the first Saiga case, the ITLOS stated in paragraph 51 of the 4
December 1997 judgement that "the standard indicated ["sufficiently
plausible"] seems particularly appropriate in view of the fact that, in the
proceedings under article 292, the Tribunal has to evaluate "allegations" by
the applicant that given provisions of the Convention are involved and
objections by the detaining state based upon its own characterization of the
rules of law on the basis of which it has acted." It was added that applying
such standard allows the Tribunal in the short time available to exercise the
required restraint in considering the necessary aspects of the merits in order to
reach its decision on the question of release.
Conclusions
On the applicability of PRP in cases of detention of foreign vessels in matters
of prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels we can say the
following:
1. Analysis of Article 292 (1) clearly establishes that there is no
alternative, but restrictive approach in interpretation and implementation
of the provisions of this Article. PRP shall be applied only where the
Convention contains in substantive parts specific provision (like Articles
73, paragraph 2; 220, paragraphs 7 and 8; or 226, paragraphs 1 "b" and
"c") concerning the prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the
posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security. This
applicability of PRP is sometimes extended. First, where one of the
abovementioned articles contains a specific list of purposes of
investigation of foreign vessels like Article 226, para.1 "a" refers to
dumping, enforcement by a port state and by a coastal state, or, second,
where one of those safeguard articles in Section 7 of the Part XII of the
Convention (like Article 233) contains such an implied, but clear,
reference for applicability. This appears not only from a textual but also
conceptual analysis.
2. Evaluation of applicability of PRP in different maritime zones with
specific limitations and exceptions in each of them seems to be useful and
necessary in order to understand properly the rights and obligations of the
flag state and the detaining state.
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3. There could be different types of applications for PRP where a court
or tribunal has to deny jurisdiction and admissibility on the case or it has
to dismiss the case:
• parties to the dispute should be state parties to the
Convention, except in cases of other international agreements
related to the purpose of the Convention;
• registration of a detained vessel is not proved;
• a detained vessel is confiscated by a court of the detaining
state;
• there are several conflicting grounds for the detention and
arrest of the vessel and one of them "prevails" as a maritime
claim different from a claim for pollution damage;
• discharge(s) of pollutants have been affected within internal
waters of a coastal state. Exceptions are possible in those
parts of the waters which earlier had innocent passage
available, but now have been enclosed by straight baselines;
• willful and serious acts of pollution in the territorial sea
which makes the passage of a foreign vessel non-innocent.
4. There may be several factors underlying the fact that the ITLOS has
dealt with no cases of PRP in the matters of prevention, reduction and
control of pollution from vessels. Among them are:
• in cases of pollution damage from a foreign vessel, the vessel
would most likely be arrested for a (or several) maritime
claim(s). Or, the owner of the vessel or his liability insurer
will arrange for the compensation fund for the full amount of
his liability. In other words, the release of the vessel will be
obtained also by means of private law, just as it would have
done before the Convention entered into force;
• any substantial maritime claim – other than for pollution
damage – could invalidate all efforts and expenses made for
realization of PRP;
• in cases of smaller discharges beyond the territorial sea of a
coastal state – and when the flag state has a normal
enforcement record – the latter has six months from the
detention for a so-called pre-emption right to take over these
proceedings from the coastal state. PRP then will be not
needed;
• in cases of inspections of seaworthiness and detention of a
foreign vessel on grounds that she is posing "unreasonable
threat to the marine environment," it seems that national
maritime administrations have so far not made mistakes in
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detention of foreign vessels because PRP would have been
necessary and applicable.58
One can find more lengthy considerations in the SIMPLY-2004 (the
Yearbook of The Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law, University of
Oslo).

58

David H.Anderson notes the vessel called Mostoles which was detained by
the Dutch Maritime Administration in Rotterdam in 1993 for suspected violation of
MARPOL. After some repairs had been made, the detention was maintained by the
competent officer because she still had on board some engine bilge water which had
been pumped into cargo slop tanks. The officer also declined the offer to seal them
because the next port of call was not disclosed or known. The owner's complaint to
the Dutch Ministry of Transport did not help, and he had to order a lighter and empty
the slop tanks of engine bilge water before he got permission for the vessel to
continue her trip. See, David H.Anderson, op.cit. 175, 176.

